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Many decision models in marketing science and psychology assume that a consumer 
chooses by proceeding sequentially through a checklist of desirable properties. These 
models are contrasted to the utility maximization model of rationality in economics. We show 
on the contrary that the two approaches are nearly equivalent. Moreover, the length of the 
shortest checklist as a proportion of the number of an agent’s indifference classes shrinks to 
0 (at an exponential rate) as the number of indifference classes increases. Checklists 
therefore provide a rapid procedural basis for utility maximization. 
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You go to a used car lot. You ﬁrst state your maximum price, then ask if any cars with
a manual transmission are available, then if any sport cars are available, then any Italian
sport cars ... and you end up driving away in a red Alfa Romeo.
In this example you make your decision when facing a set of alternatives using only
properties of the alternatives. You go through your ‘checklist’ of properties — each property
is a subset of alternatives, e.g., all sports cars — until you are able to narrow down the set
suﬃciently. At each step you eliminate the alternatives that do not have the speciﬁed
property, or, if no alternative has the property, you do not eliminate any options and
move on to the next property. No maximization of utility or of preferences is invoked.
All that is required is an ordered list of desirable attributes. An unordered list does not
qualify: in a checklist earlier properties always trump later properties. If the car buyer
checks car color only with his ﬁnal property, then color can never take precedence over
the properties earlier in the checklist.
The sequential elimination of alternatives by whether or not they possess properties
underlies several decision making models in psychology1 and marketing science.2 Any
decision procedure that follows a ﬂowchart of ‘yes or no’ questions can be written as a
checklist. Checklists can also serve as normative guides in ﬁelds such as clinical medicine
that do not make economic decisions. For example, Fischer et al. [7] develop a simple
rule to decide whether to prescribe a certain antibiotic to treat pneumonia in young
children. Because resistance can develop, this drug should be prescribed only in speciﬁc
cases. The rule is (1) if the patient has had fever for less than two days, do not prescribe,
(2) otherwise, and if the patient is less than three years old, do not prescribe, and (3)
otherwise, prescribe. We will translate the car and antibiotic examples into the language
of our model in section 2, where we incorporate deal-killing properties that a decision
must obey.
1E.g. from the classic Elimination by Aspect model by Tversky [18], to the more recent Bereby-Meyer,
Assor and Katz [1], Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig [3] and Katsikopoulos and Martignon [13].
2See e.g. Yee et al. [19]. The term ‘non-compensatory choice models’ is used in these ﬁelds to
underscore the lack of ‘tradeoﬀs’ between earlier and later properties.
2Decision-making with a checklist is considered basic precisely because it eschews the
use of preference relations over alternatives, the hallmark of economic analysis. Its at-
traction is its simplicity: in the language of Gigerenzer and Todd [10], it generates ‘fast
and frugal’ heuristics, appropriate when time, knowledge and computational power are
scarce. Gigerenzer and Todd indeed emphasize the contrast between such heuristics and
‘demonic rationality’, by which they mean preference or utility maximization.
In this paper we explore the connection between checklists and the economic model of
maximization. As the psychologists’ position illustrates, it is not clear at ﬁrst sight that
there is a connection. Moreover, the sequential elimination feature of checklists means
that discriminations among alternatives made by a property can never be overturned by
later properties: perhaps therefore the only maximizing agents that the model can capture
are those who do not make trade-oﬀsa m o n gd i ﬀerent types of goods. We will see that
the reverse is the case: agents who choose with a checklist always maximize a preference
relation, and, when agents choose among commodity bundles, checklists are tractably
short if and only if agents do display the trade-oﬀs of classical utility maximizers. In
particular, agents with a tractable checklist cannot have lexicographic preferences (where,
e.g., agents prefer more of good 1 and good 2 quantities are decisive only when good 1
quantities are tied).
Our ﬁrst result reports that an agent who uses a checklist, no matter how long, always
chooses as if he or she has a preference relation. Whatever goes on in the minds of
checklist users they act like preference maximizers. While a converse to this result also
holds — if a choice function maximizes some preference relation then it has a checklist —
this conclusion is less satisfying: the checklist might be intractably (uncountably) long
and therefore impractical.
Much of the rest of the paper is devoted to showing that in the important economic
settings rational maximizers can use the short checklists that deﬁne tractable choice pro-
cedures.
First, when an agent has n (a ﬁnite number) indiﬀerence classes the agent can make
do with a checklist with only a small number of properties relative to n.A g e n t s w i t h a
checklist can in eﬀect perform a binary search, and the ratio of the number of properties
3to n will converge to 0 at an exponential rate. For example, an agent who makes a
1,000,000 preference discriminations needs a checklist that is only 20 properties long.
Second, the prototypical economic agent who chooses among commodity bundles is
endowed with a utility function on Rn
+ that deﬁnes uncountably many indiﬀerence curves.
Despite this large set of discriminations, such an agent can make decisions with a tractable
checklist. For any ﬁnite set of alternatives, the agent will need to go through only ﬁnitely
m a n yp r o p e r t i e so nh i so rh e rc h e c k l i s tb e f o r ec o m i n gt oad e c i s i o n :t h ec h e c k l i s t‘ ﬁnitely
terminates.’ On arbitrary domains, including budget sets, the agent’s decision for any
given choice problem will be well-approximated by a ﬁnite number of checklist properties.
There is in fact a full equivalence between choosing by checklist and utility maximiza-
tion: not only will any utility-maximizer have a checklist that ﬁnitely terminates but any
agent with a checklist that ﬁnitely terminates will have a utility function. This result
requires a domain restriction, but without a domain restriction an alternative equivalence
holds: an agent maximizes utility if and only if there is a checklist that approximates
his or her behavior arbitrarily closely. The procedural model of checklists thus nearly
coincides with the economic model of rationality.
That rational agents can use a short checklist is important on two grounds. If we take
the procedural view of agents — checklists are the primitive — then we can conclude not
only that checklist agents are rational but also that they can ﬁnely discriminate among
alternatives. Alternatively if we take agents’ preferences as primitive then we conclude
that checklists are a concise way to translate preferences into choice behavior.
W ee n du pn e a rt h eG i g e r e n z e ra n dT o d d[ 1 0 ]p o i n to fv i e wb u tw i t hac a v e a t . C h e c k -
lists are indeed ‘fast and frugal’: they are a fast and frugal way to maximize utility.
2 Checklists
2.1 Standard checklists
Fix a nonempty set of alternatives X. Given a set Σ of nonempty subsets of X,ac h o i c e
function on Σ is a map c that associates with each S ∈ Σ an o n e m p t ys e tc(S) ⊂ S (the
agent’s selection from S). Following tradition, we call c a function but each c(S) is a set.
4The decision maker may have a large pool of properties to discriminate among alter-
natives, but we require that for every decision problem a ﬁnal selection is reached in a
ﬁnite number of steps.
Let I be either the ﬁnite set {1,...,n} or the entire set of natural numbers N.A
checklist is a map P that associates with each i ∈ I a set of alternatives P(i) ⊂ X.E a c h
P(i) is a property.W e s a y t h a t ‘ a l t e r n a t i v e x has property P(i)’ whenever x ∈ P(i).






Mi−1(S) ∩ P(i) if Mi−1(S) ∩ P(i) 6= ∅
Mi−1(S) otherwise
This sequence describes an elimination procedure applied to S, where at each step i the
agent checks whether the surviving alternatives have the ith property. If some alterna-
tives do have the property, the alternatives that do not are thrown away. Otherwise, all
alternatives survive the application of the property. In both cases the agent moves to
the next property.
Deﬁnition 1 A choice function c : Σ → X has a (standard) checklist if and only if
there exists a checklist P such that, for all S ∈ Σ, there is a property j ∈ I with
Mi(S)=Mj(S) for all i ≥ j
c(S)=Mj(S) (1)
If I is ﬁnite the checklist is ﬁnite a n di nt h er e m a i n i n gc a s ew h e r eI = N the checklist
is countable.
Thus a choice function that has a checklist satisﬁes two features. First, the procedure
‘ﬁnitely terminates’: for any choice set S there exists a property in the checklist such that
the procedure generates the same set of alternatives for all later properties.3 Second, this
selected set of alternatives coincides with what the choice function selects from S.
3For the agent, after reaching P(j) in Deﬁnition 1, to execute a decision the agent must conclude
that it would be pointless to consider any further properties. The agent can make this inference in two
prominent cases: if Mj is a singleton or if Mj is a subset of a single indiﬀerence class (taking preferences
as primitive in the latter case). The remaining cases are more problematic and ‘ﬁnite termination’ must
be understood as an approximate description, as we will explain in section 6.
5We call a complete and transitive binary relation on X a preference relation and say
that a choice function c with domain Σ maximizes a preference relation % if c(S)={x ∈
S : x % y for all y ∈ S} for all S ∈ Σ.
Example 1 In the car example of the introduction, we can model the option of not
choosing any car by letting some or all of the attributes be ‘deal killers,’ i.e. attributes
that a car must have for a purchase to go through. For any car lot, let an object of choice
be either a vehicle vi in the lot, or the option w of walking away without buying anything.
Ac h o i c es e tS ( ac a rl o t )t h e nh a st h ef o r m{v1,v 2,..,v n,w}. For the consumer in the
introduction, with an ordered set of desirable attributes, the ﬁrst s attributes will be deal
killers if the ﬁrst s properties all include w. For example, if attribute 1, say having price
less than $30,000, and attribute 2, having a manual transmission, are deal killers then
w ∈ P(1) and w ∈ P(2).A S that has no manual transmission car cheaper than $30,000
will then lead the consumer to walk. If every attribute is a deal killer, let w be in each
P(i) and add an extra property that repeats the ﬁnal P(i) but omits w. Then if there
is a car in S with every desirable attribute it is chosen, and w is eliminated by the extra
property; otherwise, every car in S is eliminated and w survives as the only option.
Example 2 In the medical example in the introduction, an object of choice is a child
who has had a fever for f days and is y years old, and who receives either the treatment
T = A if the antibiotic is prescribed or T = NA if the antibiotic is not prescribed, hence
at r i p l eo ft h ef o r m(f,y,T). Ac h o i c es e tS is a {(f,y,A),(f,y,NA)}:a n yg i v e nc h i l d
either does or does not receive the antibiotic. The checklist described in the introduction
is then P(1) = {(f,y,T):f<2,T = NA}, P(2) = {(f,y,T):y<3,T = NA},
P(3) = {(f,y,T):T = A} which, as desired, ensures that only a child who has had a
fever for two or more days and who is three or older receives the drug. There is a shorter
checklist that delivers the same decision rule, the single property Q(1) = P(1) ∪ P(2) ∪
{(f,y,T):f ≥ 2,y ≥ 3,T = A}. Evidently, because some alternatives do not group
together naturally in the minds of decision-makers, the shortest possible checklist may
not be the easiest to use.
Example 3 Suppose an agent has a preference relation % with n indiﬀerence classes,
labeled X(n),...,X(1) going from best to worst. Let c be a choice function that maximizes
6% on some domain Σ.T h e n P(1) = X(n), P(2) = X(n − 1),. . . ,P(n − 1) = X(2) is a
ﬁnite checklist for c.
Example 3 is a worst case scenario: the checklist has only one fewer property than
the number of indiﬀerence classes. An agent with a checklist of this sort could spend a
long time eliminating alternatives before coming to a decision. Luckily, as we will see in
section 4, the Example 3 checklists fail to be minimal when n>1.
2.2 Extended checklists
We now generalize the checklists in section 2.1 to allow uncountably many properties.
Readers uninterested in these details can skip to section 3, noting only that any checklist
in section 2.1 qualiﬁes as an one of the ‘extended checklists’ that we now deﬁne.
In our earlier elimination procedure, each set of survivors Mh(S) is a subset of its
immediate predecessor Mh−1(S). Since therefore Mi−1(S)= ∩
k<i
Mk(S),w ec o u l de q u i v a -








Mk(S) ∩ P(i) if ∩
k<i




for each i>0.T h i s s p e c i ﬁcation has the advantage that it can be applied to an
uncountable set of properties. We can therefore weaken the assumption that the indices
I in a checklist are a set of natural numbers and suppose instead that I is well-ordered
by some ≤, setting 0 as the least element of I.4 The assumption that I is well-ordered
implies that each i ∈ I has an immediate successor (the least element of {k ∈ I : i<k });
thus the procession through the checklist of properties remains orderly. Since some of
the Mi(S) need not have immediate predecessors, the above speciﬁcation uses a variant
of standard induction (transﬁnite induction) to deﬁne each Mi(S) using its entire set of
predecessors and P(i).
4As e tA is well-ordered by ≤ if ≤ is a linear order (a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric relation)
on A such that every nonempty subset of A has a least element a: a ≤ x for all x ∈ A. See Halmos [11]
for the set theory concepts we use in this section.
7We say that a choice function c has an extended checklist if c satisﬁes Deﬁnition 1
except that the Mi(S) are deﬁned as above and I is permitted to be any well-ordered set
whose least element is 0.S i n c e a n y ﬁnite set of integers or the entire set of natural numbers
is well-ordered by ≤,a n yc that has a checklist has an extended checklist. Although the
terminal step j c o n t i n u e st ob ed e ﬁn e da si nD e ﬁnition 1, j now need not be ﬁnite.
If we apply an arbitrary well-ordered set of properties to a choice set S,i tc o u l d





Mk(S)∩P(i)=∅.S i n c e c(S) 6= ∅ for any S ∈ Σ, this possibility cannot arise when a
c has an extended checklist. (It cannot even in principle happen with a ﬁnite or countable
set of properties since in that case each i ∈ I is ﬁnite.)
If c has an extended checklist that ‘ﬁnitely terminates’ — for each S ∈ Σ, the index
j identiﬁed in Deﬁnition 1 is ﬁnite — then c has a standard checklist since then we can
excise all but the properties with ﬁnite indices.
3 Checklists always maximize preference relations
We ﬁrst show that any choice function that has a checklist maximizes a preference relation.
This conclusion holds for extended checklists (and hence for standard checklists) and in
this setting an exact converse obtains. The result is valid no matter what the domain
of the choice function, for example, it applies equally to budget sets in consumer theory
and to ﬁnite sets.
Theorem 1 A choice function has an extended checklist if and only if it maximizes a
preference relation.
All proofs are in the appendix, but the arguments for Theorem 1 are easy. When a
choice function c has a standard checklist, we can identify each x ∈ X with a sequence of
‘ins’ and ‘outs’ that indicate in any coordinate i whether x is in or is not in property P(i),
and declare x % y if the x and y sequences are identical or if there is a ﬁrst coordinate
where the sequences diﬀer and x scores an ‘in’ there. This % deﬁnes a preference relation
on X and c must maximize %:i f x is chosen from some S that also contains y then
y could not score an ‘in’ before x does (this would eliminate x), and conversely if x is
8%-maximizing on S then x can never be eliminated by any y ∈ S since if there is a
ﬁr s tp r o p e r t yt h a th a so n eo fx and y but not both it must be y that is missing and is
eliminated. This reasoning is unchanged if the checklist for c is extended.5
In the other direction, we begin with a preference relation % on X that some c max-
imizes and let the properties be the (weak) upper contour sets: for each x ∈ X,s e ta
property Px equal to {y ∈ X : y % x} (ignoring the duplicates that arise when Px = Px0
because x ∼ x0). If % has a ﬁnite or countable number of indiﬀerence classes, then we can
write down these Px in a ﬁnite or countable list. When applying this standard checklist to
some S, the agent will eventually hit a property Px where x % y for all y ∈ S,w h e r e u p o n
no further eliminations can occur. If % has uncountably many indiﬀerence classes, we
have to write down the Px in a well-ordered list, and the agent will again hit the upper
contour of the best available option in S.
The case where an agent has uncountably many indiﬀerence classes is the primary
model of consumer theory. Unfortunately the checklists we have constructed in this case
are problematic: we have had to resort to a pool of properties with cardinality beyond the
natural numbers. Such checklists need not ﬁnitely terminate and therefore have no claim
to tractability or procedural realism. The problem shows up in the proof of Theorem 1
when we well-order the agent’s indiﬀerence classes, a nonconstructive step.6
The conclusion in Theorem 1 that a preference-maximizing choice function has a check-
list is therefore satisfying only when the preference relation has a ﬁnite or countable num-
ber of indiﬀerence classes; then we can generate checklists with, respectively, a ﬁnite or
countable number of properties (or in the ﬁnite case, recall Example 3). To use the
checklist model when an agent has uncountably many indiﬀerence classes, we must look
for cases where the agent can nevertheless make do with a standard checklist, i.e., a very
5A less general argument works via the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP). A choice function
with an extended checklist must satisfy WARP since if x is chosen when y i sa v a i l a b l ei tm u s tb et h a ti f
there is a ﬁrst property P(i) that contains either x or y but not both then P(i) contains x, hence if y is
chosen from any S then x must be chosen too. So on any domain where WARP implies that a choice
function maximizes some preference relation, for example the domain of ﬁnite subsets of X,ac h o i c e
function with a checklist must also maximize a preference relation.
6In standard set theory, the principle that any set can be well-ordered relies on the axiom of choice
(see Halmos [11]).
9small number of properties relative to the number of indiﬀerence classes. Since a standard
checklist must ﬁnitely terminate, this might seem too ambitious a goal.
The underlying trouble with long checklists also arises when checklists are ﬁnite. To
b eu s e f u l ,ac h e c k l i s tm u s tb es h o r t . A na g e n tw i t hn indiﬀerence classes who turns to the
Example 3 checklist with n−1 properties could end up with a procedure that is plodding
and proﬂi g a t e ,n o tf a s ta n df r u g a l .
The rest of the paper addresses these points. Can an agent with ﬁnitely many
indiﬀerence classes use a reasonably short checklist? And can the agents of consumer
theory use a standard checklist at all?
Before proceeding, we reﬁne the half of Theorem 1 stating that a choice function
with a checklist maximizes a preference relation. For the more important case, standard
checklists, we can strengthen this to ‘maximizes a utility function.’ This conclusion is
o b v i o u si fac h e c k l i s ti sﬁnite since then there can be only ﬁnitely many of the sequences of
‘ins’ and ‘outs’ described earlier. Consequently any choice function with a ﬁnite checklist
maximizes a utility function with ﬁnite range. For countable checklists, the number of
sequences remains manageable.
Ac h o i c ef u n c t i o nc : Σ → X maximizes a utility function if there exists a function
u : X → R such that c(S)={x ∈ X : u(x) ≥ u(y) for all y ∈ X} for all S ∈ Σ.
Theorem 2 If a choice function has a standard checklist then it maximizes a utility
function.
Since lexicographic preferences cannot be represented by a utility function, we con-
clude that an agent who chooses with a standard checklist cannot have such preferences.7
Checklist users, who at ﬁr s tg l a n c es e e mn o tt om a k et r a d e - o ﬀs, turn out to ﬁtt h et e x t -
book ideal of an economic consumer.
7On R2
+, for example, lexicographic preferences are deﬁned by x % y if and only if x1 >y 1 or (x1 = y1
and x2 ≥ y2).
104 Finite checklists can always be short
Suppose an agent maximizes a preference relation with n indiﬀerence classes (a ﬁnite
number): what is the shortest checklist the agent can use? These indiﬀerence classes
might be deduced from some c that has a checklist. If the preference relation that c
implicitly maximizes has n indiﬀerence classes then our question is, ‘what is the shortest
checklist for c?’.
Consider an example with four indiﬀerence classes
X = {1,2,3,4}
where the choice function c,d e ﬁn e do na l ls u b s e t so fX, maximizes the usual order ≥ on
integers. It is easy to see that P(1) = {4,3}, P(2) = {4,2} is a checklist for c.
Next, consider
X = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}
with c again maximizing ≥.D e ﬁne the checklist P(1) = {8,7,6,5}, P(2) = {8,7,4,3},
P(3) = {8,6,4,2}.A g a i n ,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tt h i si sac h e c k l i s tf o rc.( I t s u ﬃces to
consider just the two-element subsets of X.)
Notice how the ﬁrst example is nested in the second: the last two properties P(2) and
P(3) of the second example treat {5,6,7,8} and {1,2,3,4} just as P in the ﬁrst example
treats {1,2,3,4}, with the additional ﬁrst property P(1) serving only to separate the two
chains. So, we have provided a checklist with 2 properties for a preference relation with
4 levels, and a checklist with 3 properties for a preference relation with 8 levels. This
conclusion extends inductively:
Theorem 3 If c maximizes a preference relation with n indiﬀerence classes, then c has
a checklist with k properties, where k is the smallest integer such that 2k ≥ n.I f i n
addition the domain of c includes all the two-element sets then the minimum number of
properties in a checklist for c is k.
Theorem 3 shows how checklists become more and more eﬃcient as the number of
indiﬀerence classes increases. Not only will the required number of properties as a
proportion of the number of indiﬀerence classes n fall to zero as n increases, but it will
11do so at an exponential rate. Since 220 ≥ 1,000,000, Theorem 3 explains the claim
in the introduction that a 1,000,000 preference discriminations require only 20 checklist
properties.8
The pertinent feature of a choice set is its highest indiﬀerence class; in the notation of
the above examples, a decision maker needs to identify, given S ⊂ {1,...,n},t h el a r g e s t
integer in S. The solution of this problem via ‘yes or no’ questions is a classic illustration























?’, and so on. That
a recursive computer program, where the choice of the ith question depends on earlier
answers, can execute this algorithm in dlog2 ne steps is hardly news.9 What is notable
about a checklist is that it executes the algorithm nonrecursively. A property P(i) does
not change as a function of the eliminations that occur prior to i, and every property is
used for every S. To do without input from earlier steps, each property in eﬀect encodes a
set of questions. Consider again X = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8} and let m denote maxS.T h e n
P(1) ‘asks’ one question, ‘is m ∈ {8,7,6,5}?’, P(2) ‘asks’ two conditional questions, ‘if
m ∈ {8,7,6,5} then is m ∈ {8,7}?’ and ‘if m/ ∈ {8,7,6,5} then is m ∈ {4,3}?, and P(3)
‘asks’ four conditional questions. For i>1, the eliminations prior to i ensure that only
one of the antecedents of the P(i) questions is satisﬁed. Property P(i) therefore asks the
right question, and without recursive instructions or an exhaustive tree of n − 1 ‘if then’
commands (where each answer to a command leads to a distinct subsequent command).
We can compare the eﬃciency of a checklist relative to an optimal tree of ‘yes or no’
questions. If we can ask questions of the form ‘does S intersect Y ⊂ {1,...,n}?’, then,
depending on the probabilities that particular integers lie in S, the minimum expected
number of questions can be less than dlog2 ne. For example if it highly likely that
m =m a x S =4 ,t h e no n ec a nﬁrst ask ‘does S intersect {5,6,7,8}?’ and if no ‘does
S intersect {4}?’. But if each x ∈ X is equally likely to be m then dlog2 ne is the
minimum expected number of questions: the optimal tree does no better than the optimal
8If c always selects a singleton, then Theorem 3 can be rephrased using the number of alternatives in
X rather than the number of indiﬀerence classes.
9See, e.g., Knuth [14], chapter 6, Theorem B.
12checklist.10
5 Utility maximizers can have short checklists
Finite checklists are appealingly concrete: there is a uniform upper bound on the number
of properties the decision maker has to examine before the choice procedure terminates.
In an arbitrary standard checklist, it remainst r u et h a te a c hc h o i c es e tn e e d st ob ec h e c k e d
against only ﬁnitely many properties but there might not be any bound on the number
of properties that serves simultaneously for all choice sets. This small diﬀerence makes
standard checklists much more powerful.
As we will now see, an agent who makes uncountably many preference discriminations
can sometimes use a standard checklist (which therefore is ‘short’ relative to the number
of discriminations). Classical commodity consumers can thereby ﬁtu n d e rt h eu m b r e l l a
of the checklist model.
Example 4 Let the choice function c be deﬁned on all ﬁnite subsets of the real line,
and let c maximize the usual order ≥ of the real line. Deﬁne the standard checklist
P by letting, for each rational number z,ap r o p e r t yPz equal the weak upper contour
set of z, {x ∈ X : x ≥ z}, and then enumerate these properties so that exactly one is
identiﬁed with each natural number. Given any ﬁnite choice set S, the checklist deﬁned
by P eliminates in a ﬁnite number of steps all alternatives except the highest number in
S.
This simple example goes some way towards showing the reach of standard checklists.
Under certain conditions, they can mimic preference maximization even when a preference
relation admits a continuum of indiﬀerence classes. Relative to this large set of preference
discriminations, a standard checklist makes do with a small number of properties (indeed
a ﬁnite number for any speciﬁc choice set).
10If questions of the form ‘is m ∈ Y ?’ are permitted, which is exactly the game ‘Twenty questions,’
Huﬀman coding [12] generates the optimal tree. See also Zimmerman [20], and Gilbert [9] for the
connection to our problem.
13It is ‘almost’ true that any utility maximizer can choose using a standard checklist.
The claim holds precisely if the domain of choice is restricted to some family of ﬁnite
subsets of X, the universal set of alternatives. Note that no restriction is imposed on the
cardinality of X itself:
Theorem 4 If a choice function deﬁned on a domain of ﬁnite sets maximizes a utility
function then it has a standard checklist.
The following example shows that a domain restriction is indeed required in Theorem
4.
Example 5 Let X be the interval [0,1], let the domain of c be the closed sets in X,l e t
the utility function u : X −→ R that c maximizes be deﬁned by u(x)=x,a n ds u p p o s eP
is a standard checklist for c.W e w i l l s k e t c h a p r o o f i n Canonical checklists below that
we may assume that the checklist consists only of properties P(i) that are weak or strict
upper contour sets, i.e., sets of the form {x ∈ X : x ≥ q} or {x ∈ X : x>q } for some
q ∈ X. In other words, if b P is a standard checklist for c then there is also a standard
checklist P for c that consists solely of upper contour sets.
Assume then that there is a P that is a standard checklist for c that consists of upper
contours. If we call glb(i) the greatest lower bound of P(i), then there will be at most
countably many glb(i) for the properties in P.P i c k s o m e y ∈ X that is not one of these
glb(i), and set S = {x ∈ X : x ≤ y}.T h e n , f o r a n y i, Mi(S) will equal the nonempty
interval whose lower boundary equals max{glb(k):glb(k) <yand k ≤ i} and whose
upper boundary equals y. (This interval contains y but may or may not contain its lower
boundary.) Since Mi(S) 6= {y} = c(S) for all i, P could not in fact be a checklist for c.
Canonical checklists. That we may take a checklist in Example 5 to consist solely of
upper contours illustrates a wider principle. Fix some X and suppose that c is deﬁned on
a domain that includes the two-element subsets of X and that c has a standard checklist
b P.T h e n c maximizes some preference relation % w h o s es t r i c tp a r tw el a b e lÂ.W e
may assume, without loss of generality, that % is in fact a linear order. Call U ⊂ X an
14upper cut if (x ∈ U and y % x)= ⇒ y ∈ U,11 and call I ⊂ X convex if (x,y ∈ I and
x % z % y)= ⇒ z ∈ I.T h e n c also has a checklist consisting solely of upper cuts. To see
why, observe that b P(1) must be an upper cut since if x ∈ b P(1), y Â x,a n dy/ ∈ b P(1),t h e n
c({x,y})={x},a n ds oc would not maximize %. So set P(1) = b P(1).T h e a r g u m e n t
then proceeds by induction. To illustrate how the induction works, observe that while
b P(2) need not be an upper cut, we can conclude that if b P(2) is not an upper cut then it
must equal the union of an upper cut U and a convex L such that P(1) ∪ L is an upper
cut and P(1) ∩ L = ∅. If this conclusion were false, then there would be a w ∈ b P(2)
and a z/ ∈ b P(2) such that z Â w and either {w,z} ⊂ P(1) or {w,z} ∩ P(1) 6= ∅; hence
c({w,z})={w}, again violating the assumption that c maximizes %. So in the case
where b P(2) is an upper cut, set P(2) = b P(2) and in the case where b P(2) = U ∪ L,s e t
P(2) = U and P(3) = b P(1) ∪ L. An explicit induction argument would show that each
b P(i) must be the union of an upper cut and sets which can form upper cuts when joined
with the P(j), j<i ,s p e c i ﬁe di nt h ep r e v i o u ss t e p s . I ti se a s yt oc o n ﬁrm that the P
constructed in this way is a checklist for c.
While Example 5 shows that some domain limitation is needed in Theorem 4, the
restriction can be weakened. For instance, the conclusion of the theorem still holds on
any domain that includes at most countably many inﬁnite sets. But we do not have an
attractive characterization of the maximum permissible domain. So, while the converse
result, Theorem 2, is clearcut, the ideal way to ﬁll the gap in ‘A choice function ... if and
only if it has a standard checklist’ remains an open question.
For readers familiar with cardinal numbers, we can summarize the ‘shortness’ Theo-
rems 3 and 4 concisely: if an agent has a utility function u with n indiﬀerence classes,
where n is a cardinal number, then a choice function that maximizes u on a domain of
ﬁnite sets has a checklist of cardinality k if k satisﬁes 2k ≥ n.12
11For the preference relation ≥ on R, an upper cut must be a weak or strict upper contour set, but an
upper cut of an arbitrary preference relation % need not have a %-greatest lower bound.
12Two sets A and B have the same cardinality if they can be put into a one-to-one correspondence,
and A has larger cardinality if there is a one-to-one function from B to A but not vice versa.
156 Utility maximizers always have short approximate
checklists
As we have seen, the choice behavior of utility maximizers does not coincide exactly
with that of agents who use a standard checklist (a domain restriction is necessary), nor
of agents who use an extended checklist (since then we go beyond utility maximization
to preference maximization). Nevertheless, standard checklists can closely approximate
utility maximization regardless of the domain.
To capture the idea that a checklist could approximate the decision c(S) we consider
the limit of the set of survivors selected by a standard checklist: although the procedure
never yields exactly the decision c(S) at any ﬁnite step, it approximates c(S) more and
more accurately as the number of steps increases. In fact, in the limit, we get exact
equivalence between the choices of standard checklist users and utility maximizers.
As no notion of distance is present in our set-up, we use a set-theoretic deﬁnition of the
convergence of the Mi(S).A c h o i c e f u n c t i o n c : Σ → X has an approximate checklist





for all S ∈ Σ. Thus, although after any ﬁnite number of steps the set of surviving
alternatives may still contain other alternatives beside the chosen ones, it is only the
chosen alternatives that survive all steps of elimination: for any alternative rejected by
the choice function, there exists a property that it does not have.
Theorem 5 A choice function maximizes a utility function if and only if it has an ap-
proximate checklist.
Approximate checklist help explain how a countable checklist would work practically.
A countable checklist can raise a termination problem: even if no further eliminations
occur after some property P(j),t h ea g e n tm a yn o tk n o wt h i sf a c t . T h ea g e n tw i l lk n o w
it for choice functions that always select singletons or subsets of a single indiﬀerence
class (see footnote 2). But in all other cases, the practical distinction between standard
16and approximate checklists is not sharp. For both of these checklist models, the agent
would have to declare at some point that the set of alternatives had been winnowed down
adequately.
7 Remarks on preference representation
Checklists shed light on the question of how to represent preferences that cannot be
summarized by a real-valued utility function. Since Birkhoﬀ [2], the theorem that a
preference relation % on X can be represented by a real-valued utility function if and
only if X has a countable %-order-dense subset has become widely known. Yet this
theorem stands as an isolated fact in lattice theory; as Birkhoﬀ himself pointed out, it is
not useful in abstract versions of the subject. Checklists can give order density a broader
role as a representation tool. If X has a %-order-dense subset D of cardinality k and the
choice function c,d e ﬁn e do nad o m a i no fﬁnite sets, maximizes %,t h e nc has a checklist
of cardinality k: as in the proof of Theorem 4, augment D as necessary to a larger set
D+ of the same cardinality, then deﬁne a property P(d)={x ∈ X : x % d} for each
d ∈ D+ and ﬁnally well-order these properties to create a checklist. For example, in a
set theory that admits sets of a cardinality m strictly between ℵ0 (the cardinality of the
natural numbers) and 2ℵ0 (the cardinality of the real numbers), there can be preference
relations % on Rn where there is no countable %-order-dense subset of Rn but where there
is a %-order-dense subset of cardinality m. To build an example, take a subset Y ⊂ X
of cardinality m,l e t% well-order Y , set x ∼ z for all x,z ∈ X\Y , and set y Â x for all
y ∈ Y and x ∈ X\Y . In cases like this, % has no real-valued utility function. But % can
still be ‘represented’ concisely since there is a checklist of length m for any c deﬁned on a
domain of ﬁnite sets: we do not have to go to the extreme of specifying 2ℵ0 properties.13
13This example but not the general point turns on the continuum hypothesis (that there is no set of
cardinality between ℵ0 and 2ℵ0). The continuum hypothesis in fact can be posed as a conjecture solely
about checklists. Suppose % is a preference relation on Rn and that c,d e ﬁned on the ﬁnite subsets of
Rn,m a x i m i z e s%.I f c fails to have a standard checklist, then does the shortest extended checklist for
c have to have the same cardinality as Rn? In standard set theory, the question is undecidable: one
cannot prove or disprove the claim that the answer is ‘yes.’
17Checklists as a representation tool are related to Chipman’s [4] classical work on utility
theory.14 Among other topics, Chipman considered how to represent a preference relation
% on X when % has no real-valued utility function. His proposal was to use a well-
ordered and perhaps uncountable sequence of utility functions with each utility deﬁned
on a domain of cardinal numbers. The theory is much simpler, however, if utilities are
deﬁned on X. With this change, the Chipman proposal uses a sequence (ui)i∈I where
each ui maps X to R and where the set I has a well-ordering ≤.T h e n w e s a y (ui)i∈I
Chipman represents % if x % y ⇐⇒ (for any i with ui(y) >u i(x) there exists j ≤ i with
uj(x) >u j(y)). Any preference relation % can be Chipman represented: as in the proof
of Theorem 4, let ≤ be a well-ordering of X,d e ﬁne P(x)={y ∈ X : y % x} for any x,
and then set ux(z)=1if z ∈ P(x) and ux(z)=0if z/ ∈ P(x). In Chipman’s proof of
this result, his speciﬁcation of (ui)i∈I was more complicated, but it shares the feature that
the range of each ui consists of only two points. Since a utility with a two-point range
deﬁnes a partition of X, Chipman’s proof implicitly speciﬁes a checklist. In Chipman’s
general framework, on the other hand, utilities map to R, and so his model does not
normally deﬁne a set of properties or a sequential decision-making procedure. Chipman
did not consider the possibility, mentioned in the previous paragraph, of a (ui)i∈I with
fewer than 2ℵ0 functions for a % on Rn that does not have a classical utility function.15
The possibility shows, in either Chipman’s framework or ours, that all is not lost when
countable order-density fails: concise representation is still feasible.
8 Concluding remarks
Although we believe that the checklist model is new, we should mention Rubinstein [16]
which (to the best of our knowledge) is the ﬁrst mention in the economic literature of
the potential importance of unary relations (what we call properties)i nd e c i s i o nm a k i n g .
Although distantly related, that work was the initial stimulus for this project.
There are ways to choose by checklist that do not ﬁt the model of this paper. Check-
14We thank Chris Tyson for stressing the connection between ours and Chipman’s work.
15Not surprisingly since Chipman’s work precedes that of Cohen [5] [6] showing that sets of cardinality
between ℵ0 and 2ℵ0 are consistent with the standard axioms of set theory.
18lists as we have deﬁned them are ﬁxed across choice sets. Consequently an agent shopping
for a camera, who looks for cameras on the top shelf, then for those priced between $225
and $250, and then for those with black ﬁnish could choose diﬀerent cameras from stores
that stocked the same set of cameras but put them on diﬀerent shelves. The properties
(sets of cameras) in this list diﬀer by store; if we think of a store as a choice set, our model
rules this out. Rubinstein and Salant [17] better ﬁts this situation: the alternatives in
each choice problem are presented to the decision maker in an exogenously speciﬁed order
(e.g., the element on the top shelf is seen before the element on the next shelf). A choice
problem is then an ordered list of alternatives (a1,...,ak), and a choice function associates
each such list with one of its elements.
Manzini and Mariotti [15] characterize the choice behavior that arises when an agent
sequentially eliminates alternatives using an ordered sequence of binary relations (keeping
at each step only the maximal alternatives). In that case behavior may be very far from
utility maximization.
With unary relations, the gulf between extended checklists and standard checklists
underlines how the latter form fast and eﬃcient choice procedures. That such models
turn out to be so close to utility maximization came as a surprise to us.
9 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: Let the choice function c have the extended checklist P.W e
identify each x ∈ X with the vector px ∈ {0,1}I given by px(i)=1if x ∈ P(i) and
px(i)=0if x/ ∈ P(i) (of course each px can be associated with many alternatives). We
order {0,1}I lexicographically: for p,q ∈ {0,1}I, p % q ⇐⇒ (q(i) >p (i)= ⇒∃ k<i
with p(k) >q (k)). The asymmetric and symmetric parts of % are labeled Â and ∼
respectively. To conclude that % is a linear order, we could appeal to the fact that if %
is the lexicographic order of any family of linear orders with well-ordered indices then %
is also a linear order. But to argue directly, completeness follows from the fact that (1) if
p = q then (q(i) >p (i)= ⇒∃ k<iwith p(k) >q (k)) obtains vacuously, while (2) if p 6= q
then the well-ordering of I implies that j =m i n {i : p(i) 6= q(i)} is well-deﬁned and hence
19p Â q if p(j) >q (j) and q Â p if q(j) >p (j). Case (2) also yields antisymmetry. For
transitivity, if p ∼ q ∼ r then p = q = r and hence p ∼ r. If on the other hand p % q Â r
or p Â q % r set j =m i n {i : p(i) 6= q(i) or q(i) 6= r(i)}.T h e n p(j) ≥ q(j) ≥ r(j) with at
least one strict inequality. Hence p(j) >r (j) and p(i)=r(i) for i<j , i.e., p Â r.
Let % also now denote the relation on X given by x % y ⇐⇒ px % py:s i n c e% on
{0,1}I is a linear order, % on X is a preference relation. To see that for any S ∈ Σ,
c(S)={x ∈ S : x % y for all y ∈ S}, suppose ﬁrst that x ∈ c(S).I f y Â x for some
y ∈ S and we set j =m i n {i : px(i) 6= py(i)} then the fact that x ∈ Mi(S) for all i<j
implies that y ∈ Mi(S) for all i<j . But since y ∈ P(j) and x/ ∈ P(j), x/ ∈ Mj(S),
contradicting x ∈ c(S). Conversely suppose x ∈ S and x % y for all y ∈ S. Then, since
c(S) is nonempty, x % z for some z ∈ c(S).S i n c e z ∈ Mi(S) for all i, x % z implies
{i : px(i) 6= pz(i)} = ∅ (otherwise z would be eliminated at min{i : px(i) 6= pz(i)}). So
x ∈ Mi(S) for all i, i.e., x ∈ c(S).
Now suppose that c maximizes some preference relation %. To construct a checklist,
let I = X ∪{0} and let ≤ be a well-ordering of I with 0 <xfor any x ∈ X. (This is the
nonconstructive step mentioned in the text: the principle that any set can be well-ordered
relies on the axiom of choice.) For each x ∈ X deﬁne P (x)={y ∈ X : y % x}.F i x
S ∈ Σ and some x ∈ c(S). Then, for any z ∈ X with x/ ∈ P (z),t h ef a c tt h a tx % y
for y ∈ S and the transitivity of % imply y/ ∈ P (z) for y ∈ S.S o , f o r a n y z ∈ X,i f
x ∈∩ w<zMw(S) then x ∈ Mz(S).S i n c e x ∈ M0(S),t r a n s ﬁnite induction implies that
x ∈ Mz(S) for all z ∈ X.M o r e o v e r , f o r a l l y/ ∈ c(S), y/ ∈ P(x) and so y/ ∈ Mx(S).
Finally observe that Mz(S)=Mx(S) for all z such that x ≤ z, so that the terminal step
j in Deﬁnition 1 is well deﬁned.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let c have a standard checklist P : I → 2X.A s i n T h e o r e m
1, given P,e a c hx ∈ X can be associated with a unique px ∈ {0,1}
I,w h e r et h eith
component is deﬁned by px(i)=1if x ∈ P (i) and px(i)=0if x/ ∈ P (i).D e ﬁne











3i for any i ∈ I,t h i su represents the lexicographic order % on {0,1}I deﬁned
in the proof of Theorem 1 (that is, x % y ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(y)). That proof also shows that
20c(S)={x ∈ X : x % y for all y ∈ X} for all S ∈ Σ. Hence c(S)={x ∈ X : u(x) ≥ u(y)
for all y ∈ X}.
Proof of Theorem 3: For any n,l e t1,...,n denote the indiﬀerence classes of
t h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o n% and let the linear order over {1,...,n} that c induces be ≥
(the standard order on the integers). That is, g ≥ h for g,h ∈ {1,...,n} if and only
if, for all x ∈ g and y ∈ h, x % y.I t i s s u ﬃcient to consider a choice function c
deﬁn e do ns u b s e t so f{1,...,n} that always selects the ≥-maximal element. Speciﬁcally,
if b c i st h ec h o i c ef u n c t i o nt h a tm a x i m i z e s%,t h e nl e tS be in the domain of c if and
only if there is a b S in the domain of b c such that
³




g ∈ S =⇒ (∃x ∈ b S such that x ∈ g)
´
.
Both conclusions of the theorem hold for n =1since the empty set of properties is
minimal. So assume henceforth that n>1.
Regarding minimality, suppose c has a checklist P with s properties. As in the proof
of Theorem 1, identify each x ∈ {1,...,n} with the px ∈ {0,1}s given by px(i)=1if
x ∈ P(i) and px(i)=0if x/ ∈ P(i). Since there are 2s elements in {0,1}s and given that
n>1, 2s <nwould imply that px = py f o rs o m ed i s t i n c tp a i rx,y ∈ {1,...,n}.S i n c e t h e
domain of c contains the two-element sets, then {x,y} ∈ Σ and thus c({x,y})={x,y},
contradicting the assumption that c maximizes ≥. So for this domain we cannot have
2s <n .
Regarding ‘there exists a checklist with k properties, where k is the smallest integer
such that 2k ≥ n,’ suppose this claim holds for 1,...,n − 1. Partition {1,...,n} into
Zl = {1,...,m} and Zu = {m+1,...,n},w h e r em = nÁ2 if n is even and m =( n+1)Á2
if n is odd. Then, since n>1,w eh a v e2k−1 ≥ |Zr| for both r = l and r = u.
The induction hypothesis implies that c|Zu (the choice function deﬁned by restricting c
to subsets of Zu) has a checklist P =( P(1),...,P(k − 1)) and that c|Zl has a checklist
P0 =( P0(1),...,P 0(k−1)).D e ﬁne the checklist Q by Q(1) = Zu and Q(i+1) = P(i)∪P0(i)
for i =1 ,...,k − 1.
For any checklist R,l e tMR
i (S) denote the ith set of survivors when R is applied to
t h ec h o i c es e tS.





21c|Zu(S ∩Zu)=c(S),a n ds i m i l a r l yi fS ∈ Zl then M
Q
k (S)=c(S). For all S that contain
both elements of Zl and elements of Zu, application of Q(1) yields M
Q
1 (S)=S ∩ Q(1) =
S ∩ Zu.S i n c e Q(i +1 )∩ Zu = P(i),f o ri =1 ,...,k − 1, application of properties Q(2)
through Q(k) yields M
Q
k (S)=MP
k−1(S ∩ Zu)=c|Zu(S ∩ Zu)=c(S).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 :L e t c be a choice function with domain Σ that maximizes
u : X → R,l e t% be the preference relation on X that u represents, and let Â and ∼ be,
respectively, the asymmetric and symmetric part of %.S i n c e % has a utility, there exists
a ﬁnite or countable order dense subset D ⊂ X,t h a ti saD such that for all x,y ∈ X
with x Â y there exists d ∈ D with x % d % y (see, e.g., Fishburn [8], chapter 7). For
% where no indiﬀerence class has an immediate successor, as in Examples 4 and 5, the
upper contour sets deﬁned by the d ∈ D will discriminate between any two strictly ranked
options. For the general case, we augment D as follows. For each d ∈ D,d e ﬁne the
(possibly empty) set of immediate successors to d, σ(d)={x ∈ X : x Â d and there does
not exist y ∈ X such that x Â y Â d}.I f σ(d) 6= ∅,l e ts(d) be an arbitrary element of
σ(d). Then set D+ = D ∪{z ∈ X : z = s(d) for some d ∈ D with σ(d) 6= ∅}.S i n c e D is
at most countable, so is D+. (For the purposes of section 7, we record that for a D with
inﬁnite cardinality, D+ will have the same cardinality as D.)
Enumerate D+:f o re i t h e rI = {1,...,n} or I = N let f be a bijection from I to D+.
Deﬁne the checklist P by P(i)={x ∈ X : x % f(i)} for i ∈ I.
Fix some S ∈ Σ and let x ∈ c(S).S o x % y for all y ∈ S. Since for all y ∈ S and
all i ∈ I, (y ∈ P (i) ⇒ x ∈ P (i)), x ∈ Mi (S) for all i ∈ I.F o r e a c h y ∈ S\c(S), x Â y
and so there exists a d ∈ D with x % d % y.I f d Â y for one such d then there is ab i ∈ I
with x ∈ P(b i) and y/ ∈ P(b i). If on the other hand d ∼ y for all d ∈ D with x % d % y
then x ∈ σ(y) (if not then there would be a z with x Â z Â y and hence a d0 ∈ D with
x % d0 % z Â y). So there exists e ∈ D+ with e ∼ x and again there exists b i ∈ I with
x ∈ P(b i) and y/ ∈ P(b i).W e c a n d e ﬁne a b i,s a yb i(y),f o ra n yy ∈ S\c(S).S i n c e S is
ﬁnite, there is a j ∈ I such that j ≥b i(y) for all y ∈ S\c(S). Hence Mi (S)=Mj (S) for
all i ≥ j and thus Mj (S)=c(S).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 :T h ep a r to ft h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m1t h a ts h o w st h a tac with
ac h e c k l i s tP : I −→ 2X maximizes the lexicographic order on {0,1}I never uses the fact
22that P ﬁnitely terminates. The proof of Theorem 2 therefore also does not use ﬁnite
termination, and so that proof establishes the ‘if’ part of the present Theorem. For
the ‘only if’ part, where we are given a utility u that represents some % and a c that
maximizes u, we can follow the construction of the %-dense set D+, associated indices I,
and checklist P i nt h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 . O n c ea g a i nf o ra l lx ∈ c(S) and i ∈ I,w e
have (y ∈ P(i) ⇒ x ∈ P(i)).S o i f x ∈∩ i<jMi (S) for some j,i tm u s tb ex ∈ Mj (S),a n d
therefore x ∈ Mi (S) for all i ∈ I.A n d f o r a l l y ∈ S\{c(S)},w h e r et h e r e f o r ex Â y,t h e r e
must exist i ∈ D+ such that x ∈ P(i) and y/ ∈ P(i) (again, by the same argument given in
t h ep r e v i o u sp r o o f ) . S oi tm u s tb et h a ty/ ∈∩ i∈D+Mi (S), and thus c(S)=∩i∈D+Mi (S).
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